<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0"><channel><title>Refrigeration - Tag - Maritimeinfosec.org</title><link>https://maritimeinfosec.org/tags/refrigeration/</link><description>Refrigeration - Tag - Maritimeinfosec.org</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-US</language><copyright>Copyright Maritimeinfosec.org 2018-2026</copyright><lastBuildDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 09:00:00 +0200</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://maritimeinfosec.org/tags/refrigeration/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Exposed refrigeration controllers, NIS2, CRA, Starlink</title><link>https://maritimeinfosec.org/exposed-refrigeration-controllers-and-starlink-tracking-on-board/</link><pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 09:00:00 +0200</pubDate><author>Olivier JACQ</author><guid>https://maritimeinfosec.org/exposed-refrigeration-controllers-and-starlink-tracking-on-board/</guid><description><![CDATA[<p>On 12 October 2026 (after plenty of alerts, press coverage and what have you), CERT-FR published, cold, an alert about &ldquo;numerous compromises&rdquo; of remote controllers for refrigeration installations. It first covered Danfoss AK-SC and AK-SM units, and an update on 13 October added Copeland xweb and Dixell xweb controllers <a href="https://cert.cyber.gouv.fr/alerte/CERTFR-2026-ALE-012/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer ">[1]</a>. The attacks date from the night of 11 to 12 October (attacking at night and over the weekend is, after all, the most damaging pattern). The alert points - surprise - to administration interfaces exposed directly on the Internet. CERT-FR asks (what ANSSI has <em>been recommending for years</em>) that exposure be removed, that equipment be reached only through a VPN (<em>Virtual Private Network</em>) or a protected network, that equipment be updated (well, often it is end-of-life&hellip;) and that default passwords be changed.</p>]]></description></item></channel></rss>