Maritime - Tag - Maritimeinfosec.org

Olivier JACQ — Thu, 25 Oct 2018 21:29:01 +0800

The maritime sector: a global pillar that often goes unnoticed

The idea of this short article is not to draw an exhaustive picture of the maritime sector — the exercise would be far too long given how vast and fascinating the field is — but rather to recall a few orders of magnitude and key facts about an environment that is still too often overlooked.

On a global scale, the sea is omnipresent.
It covers 71% of the Earth’s surface, and 95% of global communications pass through submarine cables.
From a commercial point of view, 90% of the goods traded worldwide are transported by sea.

Maritime phishing: analysis of US Coast Guard cyber bulletin MCB 01-26

Olivier JACQ — Sat, 21 Mar 2026 18:00:00 +0000

On March 18, 2026, the US Coast Guard published a cyber bulletin titled MCB 01-26: Awareness for Increased Phishing (available at the end of this article). This short document aims to shed light on the evolution of cyber threats in the maritime sector, and more specifically on the growing role of phishing attacks in incidents affecting the Marine Transportation System (MTS). It is not specified—although it naturally comes to mind—whether the release of this bulletin is directly linked to the current conflict in the Persian Gulf and the risk of phishing attacks originating from Iran.

When Marine Technology, Ocean Development and the Law of the Sea addresses maritime cybersecurity, GNSS risks and autonomous vessels

Olivier JACQ — Sat, 21 Mar 2026 14:30:00 +0000

The collective volume Marine Technology, Ocean Development and the Law of the Sea (2026), available as open access, devotes significant attention to digital issues, with numerous occurrences of the term “cyber” and several chapters more broadly dedicated to the security of maritime systems.

GNSS, jamming and spoofing: a clearly documented risk

The chapter on maritime cybersecurity provides a detailed description of the threats affecting GNSS systems. It recalls that associated attacks (spoofing, jamming) can lead to a loss of reliable positioning and to navigation errors, directly impacting maritime safety. It also emphasizes that users must “plan” (or at least anticipate!) “potential GPS disruptions, authenticate the reliability of received data and consider alternative positioning sources” (cyber chapter, pp. 278–280).

Ireland: a 2026–2030 maritime strategy addressing cyber issues and subsea cables

Olivier JACQ — Sat, 21 Mar 2026 12:00:00 +0000

Ireland published in February 2026 its first national maritime security strategy (National Maritime Security Strategy 2026–2030).

This document marks an important evolution for this island state, which we particularly appreciate, highly dependent on its maritime infrastructure, but historically limited in terms of surveillance and protection capabilities over its maritime domain.

The strategy explicitly identifies the protection of critical infrastructure as a central issue, in particular subsea telecommunications cables and energy interconnectors (such as the Celtic Interconnector). These infrastructures are presented as essential to the country’s economic and digital functioning, in a context where a significant share of transatlantic data flows passes close to Irish waters.

GNSS jamming and spoofing: when a hypothesis gradually becomes a... fact

Olivier JACQ — Sun, 15 Mar 2026 10:00:00 +0000

Over the past few days, there has been a noticeable increase in publications discussing GNSS interference, particularly GPS jamming and spoofing.

This brings me back to a case that is frequently cited in public and private reports, both in France and internationally: the collision that occurred off the coast of Oman between two vessels, which continues to be mentioned as an example of a collision “linked” to GPS spoofing.

What catches my attention is not the hypothesis itself.
GNSS interference in that region is documented and certainly not a new phenomenon. It obviously deserves to be taken seriously.

EU Industrial Maritime Strategy highlights emerging cybersecurity risks.

Olivier JACQ — Wed, 04 Mar 2026 09:00:00 +0000

On 4 March 2026, the European Commission released two separate communications outlining its vision for the future of the maritime sector: an Industrial Maritime Strategy and a dedicated strategy for European ports.

The first document, the EU Industrial Maritime Strategy, aims to strengthen the competitiveness and strategic autonomy of Europe’s maritime industries.

The full document is available here:
https://transport.ec.europa.eu/document/download/2cda36ec-b5fc-4cc9-9091-a8014ba8177e_en?filename=communication_on_EU_industrial_maritime_strategy_3.pdf

Beyond industrial and energy considerations, the strategy also highlights the growing importance of security challenges in the maritime domain.

Foreign interference on a ferry in Sète: between Raspberry Pi, RAT and media overreaction

Olivier JACQ — Wed, 24 Dec 2025 17:30:00 +0000

The case of the ferry Fantastic (operated by the Italian company Grandi Navi Veloci, GNV) in Sète, in December 2025, is interesting for several reasons. Not so much for its technical sophistication — which remains limited — but for what it reveals about how cyber incidents are handled, particularly in the maritime domain.

Very quickly, the event was portrayed as a potentially serious case of foreign interference, or even as a scenario involving remote control of a vessel. The reality, as it gradually emerges from publicly available information, is more nuanced — and probably more instructive.

Maritime collision and GNSS spoofing: waiting for the facts before drawing conclusions

Olivier JACQ — Wed, 18 Jun 2025 10:00:00 +0000

Only a few hours after the collision between two vessels off the coast of Oman, the first claims attributing the accident to GNSS spoofing (GPS spoofing) began to circulate.

It is likely that we will soon see many screenshots and analyses claiming that GPS spoofing is responsible… or that it is not.

As is often the case with this type of event, it is better to wait for the results of the investigation before drawing conclusions.

Launch of an insurance product dedicated to maritime cyber risks

Olivier JACQ — Mon, 04 May 2020 11:17:07 +0000

In a press release, the insurer Willis Towers Watson announced the launch of a new insurance product specifically designed to cover cybersecurity risks in the maritime sector. The objective of this product is to address the incomplete coverage of cyber risks in most traditional insurance policies and to respond to the growing number of cyber incidents affecting the maritime industry.

The policy reportedly covers several situations, including: crisis management in the event of ransomware attacks, data theft, incidents involving third parties, loss of connectivity following attacks on satellite communication links, as well as cases related to GDPR and the NIS Directive.