This brings me back to a case that is frequently cited in public and private reports, both in France and internationally: the collision that occurred off the coast of Oman between two vessels, which continues to be mentioned as an example of a collision “linked” to GPS spoofing.

What catches my attention is not the hypothesis itself.
GNSS interference in that region is documented and certainly not a new phenomenon. It obviously deserves to be taken seriously.

TL,DR: The BIMCO webinar, held on the 3rd of septembre 2025, was moderated by Jakob Larsen and featured NATO MARCOM officers Eric (French Navy) and Kadir (Turkish Navy) on GPS jamming and spoofing threats to maritime operations. Eric highlighted recent incidents: Ursula von der Leyen’s aircraft disrupted by jamming in Bulgaria, the merchant vessel Green Admire spoofed near Russia, and widespread interference in the Eastern Mediterranean linked to military activity. He emphasized that GNSS disruption is now a deliberate tool of hybrid warfare, not accidental.

It is likely that we will soon see many screenshots and analyses claiming that GPS spoofing is responsible… or that it is not.

As is often the case with this type of event, it is better to wait for the results of the investigation before drawing conclusions.

ESA has awarded a contract to the Swiss company CYSEC SA to identify possible approaches for strengthening the security of satellite-based ship tracking and positioning services used in the maritime sector. The main risks involve spoofing and jamming of satellite positioning systems (GNSS), as discussed previously here.

Since May 2019, the U.S. authorities have recorded numerous unlawful activities in the region. In two of those cases, GPS interference occurred at the same time as other suspicious events.

Today, the relatively low cost (a few tens of euros for a basic receiver), the miniaturization of hardware, and the widespread availability of GPS receivers have led many to assume that this global infrastructure will always be available. These advantages have also enabled the rapid expansion of GPS usage across many sectors where it was previously absent: healthcare, pet tracking, sports, agriculture, domestic robotics such as lawn mowers, photography, and even port cranes (see also this article). As a result, it is now difficult to estimate how many GPS receivers are currently deployed worldwide.

I have mentioned this several times before: GPS signals (and GNSS more broadly) are essential for the safe day-to-day operation of the maritime sector. We have already discussed the risks associated with spoofing or jamming of these signals, the specific risks related to autonomous maritime vehicles, as well as several real-world examples, including incidents in the Persian Gulf.

On March 10, 2020, the United States formally raised concerns with the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) regarding the increasing number of disruptions affecting GPS and GNSS signals. The submission, available here, calls on the IMO to urgently address cases of jamming and spoofing that threaten the safety of ships and seafarers.

For vessels, these scenarios may include:

• attempts to spoof or jam positioning or communication systems, either directly targeting the vessel or affecting its surrounding environment
• malfunctions or loss of availability of ECDIS navigation systems, even though these systems are often deployed with redundancy
• the transmission of false safety information to vessels (GMDSS alerts, AIS data, weather information, etc.)
• intrusions targeting onboard industrial control systems, including propulsion, navigation, or cargo management systems
• the remote takeover of a vessel or part of its systems
• the partial or complete encryption of onboard information systems through ransomware attacks

Ports are also exposed to similar risks, including:

The BBC reports that Russia is suspected of having jammed the global GPS positioning system during a major NATO exercise called Trident Juncture. This is not particularly surprising, as it is a known Russian capability and has already been suspected of being used on several occasions. The area affected would have included Lapland and territories close to the Russian border in northern Norway.

At the end of the article, the BBC also mentions the accident involving the Norwegian frigate Helge Ingstad, which collided with an oil tanker in southern Norway, although it stops short of drawing any direct link between the two events.

In this article, I explain in more detail what a maritime information system is, attempting to classify them as clearly as possible.

Maritime information systems can refer to different types of infrastructure:

• ships:
  • merchant vessels
  • warships
  • recreational vessels
  • fishing vessels
  • scientific / hydro-oceanographic / fisheries research vessels
  • barges
• ports and naval infrastructures:
  • container loading/unloading systems, smartports, logistics systems
  • Port and Cargo Community Systems
  • cranes and gantries
  • dock and basin management systems
  • locks
  • pipelines
• other onshore facilities:
  • maritime informatics of signal stations, MRCC (Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers), ship command and management centers
• offshore installations:
  • drilling platforms
  • Marine Renewable Energies (MRE): wind turbines, tidal turbines…

Next, to make things easier to understand, I tend to divide systems into two major families: “IT” systems (Information Technology), which are fairly similar to what can be found in other sectors, and “OT” systems (Operational Technology), which, to simplify, could be described as “operational systems”, more specific to the maritime information domain.