<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0"><channel><title>Ferry - Tag - Maritimeinfosec.org</title><link>https://maritimeinfosec.org/tags/ferry/</link><description>Ferry - Tag - Maritimeinfosec.org</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-US</language><copyright>Copyright Maritimeinfosec.org 2018-2026</copyright><lastBuildDate>Wed, 24 Dec 2025 17:30:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://maritimeinfosec.org/tags/ferry/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Foreign interference on a ferry in Sète: between Raspberry Pi, RAT and media overreaction</title><link>https://maritimeinfosec.org/ferry-fantastic-raspberry-pi-internal-threat/</link><pubDate>Wed, 24 Dec 2025 17:30:00 +0000</pubDate><author>Olivier JACQ</author><guid>https://maritimeinfosec.org/ferry-fantastic-raspberry-pi-internal-threat/</guid><description><![CDATA[<p>The case of the ferry <em>Fantastic</em> (operated by the Italian company Grandi Navi Veloci, GNV) in Sète, in December 2025, is interesting for several reasons. Not so much for its technical sophistication — which remains limited — but for what it reveals about how cyber incidents are handled, particularly in the maritime domain.</p>
<p>Very quickly, the event was portrayed as a potentially serious case of foreign interference, or even as a scenario involving remote control of a vessel. The reality, as it gradually emerges from publicly available information, is more nuanced — and probably more instructive.</p>]]></description></item></channel></rss>