<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0"><channel><title>AIS - Tag - Maritimeinfosec.org</title><link>https://maritimeinfosec.org/tags/ais/</link><description>AIS - Tag - Maritimeinfosec.org</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-US</language><copyright>Copyright Maritimeinfosec.org 2018-2026</copyright><lastBuildDate>Fri, 05 Sep 2025 09:32:34 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://maritimeinfosec.org/tags/ais/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Lost at Sea: Confronting GPS Jamming and Spoofing in Maritime Operations</title><link>https://maritimeinfosec.org/en/lost-at-sea-confronting-GPS-jamming-and-spoofing-in-maritime-operations/</link><pubDate>Fri, 05 Sep 2025 09:32:34 +0000</pubDate><author>Olivier JACQ</author><guid>https://maritimeinfosec.org/en/lost-at-sea-confronting-GPS-jamming-and-spoofing-in-maritime-operations/</guid><description><![CDATA[<div class="featured-image">
                <img src="/images/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Capture-decran-du-2025-09-05-11-29-53.png" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
            </div><p>TL,DR: <strong>The BIMCO webinar, held on the 3rd of septembre 2025, was moderated by Jakob Larsen and featured NATO MARCOM officers Eric (French Navy) and Kadir (Turkish Navy) on GPS jamming and spoofing threats to maritime operations. Eric highlighted recent incidents: Ursula von der Leyen’s aircraft disrupted by jamming in Bulgaria, the merchant vessel <em>Green Admire</em> spoofed near Russia, and widespread interference in the Eastern Mediterranean linked to military activity. He emphasized that GNSS disruption is now a deliberate tool of hybrid warfare, not accidental.</strong></p>]]></description></item><item><title>The European Space Agency funds research on risks related to satellite positioning systems</title><link>https://maritimeinfosec.org/the-european-space-agency-funds-research-on-risks-related-to-satellite-positioning-systems/</link><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2020 21:39:55 +0000</pubDate><author>Olivier JACQ</author><guid>https://maritimeinfosec.org/the-european-space-agency-funds-research-on-risks-related-to-satellite-positioning-systems/</guid><description><![CDATA[<p>As discussed several times on this site, the risks associated with satellite-based positioning and vessel tracking systems are numerous. In this context, the European Space Agency (<a href="https://www.esa.int/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer ">European Space Agency, ESA</a>) has <a href="https://www.rivieramm.com/news-content-hub/space-agency-looks-to-tighten-ship-tracking-and-navigation-security-59077" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer ">recently announced</a> that it is funding a feasibility study to develop solutions aimed at securing these systems.</p>
<p>ESA has awarded a contract to the Swiss company <a href="https://www.cysec.systems/2020/04/22/cysec-wins-european-space-agency-contract-to-protect-ship-tracking-communications-from-cyber-threats/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer ">CYSEC SA</a> to identify possible approaches for strengthening the security of satellite-based ship tracking and positioning services used in the maritime sector. The main risks involve spoofing and jamming of satellite positioning systems (GNSS), as discussed previously <a href="/les-tensions-us-iran-dans-le-golfe-persique-font-craindre-encore-du-leurrage-brouillage-GPS/" rel="">here</a>.</p>]]></description></item><item><title>Maritime information systems</title><link>https://maritimeinfosec.org/maritime-information-systems/</link><pubDate>Fri, 26 Oct 2018 14:08:42 +0000</pubDate><author>Olivier JACQ</author><guid>https://maritimeinfosec.org/maritime-information-systems/</guid><description><![CDATA[<div class="featured-image">
                <img src="/images/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Capture-d%e2%80%99%c3%a9cran-du-2018-10-24-07-12-41-e1540547836953.png" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
            </div><p>In this article, I explain in more detail what a maritime information system is, attempting to classify them as clearly as possible.</p>
<p>Maritime information systems can refer to different types of infrastructure:</p>
<ul>
<li>ships:
<ul>
<li>merchant vessels</li>
<li>warships</li>
<li>recreational vessels</li>
<li>fishing vessels</li>
<li>scientific / hydro-oceanographic / fisheries research vessels</li>
<li>barges</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>ports and naval infrastructures:
<ul>
<li>container loading/unloading systems, <em>smartports</em>, logistics systems</li>
<li><em>Port</em> and <em>Cargo Community Systems</em></li>
<li>cranes and gantries</li>
<li>dock and basin management systems</li>
<li>locks</li>
<li>pipelines</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>other onshore facilities:
<ul>
<li>maritime informatics of signal stations, MRCC (Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers), ship command and management centers</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>offshore installations:
<ul>
<li>drilling platforms</li>
<li>Marine Renewable Energies (MRE): wind turbines, tidal turbines&hellip;</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p>Next, to make things easier to understand, I tend to divide systems into two major families: &ldquo;IT&rdquo; systems (<em>Information Technology</em>), which are fairly similar to what can be found in other sectors, and &ldquo;OT&rdquo; systems (<em>Operational Technology</em>), which, to simplify, could be described as “operational systems”, more specific to the maritime information domain.</p>]]></description></item></channel></rss>