Analysis of the BIMCO webinar on solutions against GNSS spoofing and jamming

Following a previous webinar, in February 2026, in connection with current developments in the Persian Gulf, BIMCO hosted a webinar dedicated to GNSS interference. I encourage you to watch it, and here is a brief personal analysis. This webinar had an immediate merit: amid the numerous publications on the subject (particularly on LinkedIn), and although the topic is not new (especially since the conflict between Russia and Ukraine), it did not treat jamming and spoofing as a purely theoretical issue reserved for specialists, nor from a purely alarmist perspective, but as a now very real operational risk for commercial navigation.

On this point, the diagnosis is difficult to dispute. In several maritime regions (Baltic Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, Black Sea, Persian Gulf, Asia), GNSS loss is no longer a rare anomaly. It is a degraded mode that must be anticipated, detected, and, above all, managed. The webinar therefore started from a correct premise: in an increasingly contested environment, continuing to consider satellite signals as a given reflects a form of technical optimism that is still too widespread.

The webinar then gave significant space to a consortium to present its solution and feedback. The interest of the demonstration was not so much in promising a “more robust GPS,” but rather in proposing a broader logic of PNT resilience (Position, Navigation, and Timing).

The main strength: finally moving beyond the “all-GNSS” reflex

The speakers described several disruption events in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Baltic, and other sensitive areas. Their account was valuable not only because it was based on real incidents, but also because it highlighted a frequently misunderstood reality: when GNSS degrades, it is not only the position that becomes uncertain.

On board a modern vessel, GNSS supports far more than bridge displays. It also provides a time reference, feeds synchronization functions, supports the consistency of several interconnected systems (GMDSS, satellite communications, etc.), and sometimes plays a role in equipment that is not immediately associated with navigation.

It is therefore essential to stress one point: there are not just “one” or “two” GNSS receivers on board, but often many more. On certain modern vessels, there can be around ten, sometimes more, distributed across different functions. Typically, two GNSS receivers (single or multi-constellation) feed ECDIS, AIS, GMDSS, NTP network timing, DP systems, but others may also be embedded within satellite communication antennas, which themselves rely on GNSS references for pointing or synchronization functions. In addition, there are external devices used by pilots, such as Portable Pilot Units (PPU). This dispersion of GNSS across onboard architecture is critical to understand: interference does not just affect a single sensor, it can impact an entire technical chain, sometimes with poorly anticipated side effects.

From this perspective, the BIMCO webinar was useful, because it moved beyond the overly simplistic question: “what happens if GPS fails?” The real question has become: “what happens when everything that depends, directly or indirectly, on GNSS starts to diverge?”

The solution presented

The proposed solution is based on several components: a multi-constellation GNSS receiver, anomaly detection capabilities, an alternative GNSS-independent PNT source via the Iridium network (once again, still satellite-based), and a supervision and logging layer both onboard and ashore.

From an architectural standpoint, the approach is coherent. Jamming and spoofing cannot be addressed seriously with a single-layer response. The only credible strategy is to introduce diversity: diversity of constellations, sources, processing methods, and monitoring chains.

The distinctive feature highlighted during the webinar is the use of a GNSS-independent PNT capability based on Iridium. The argument is well known: lower-orbit satellites, stronger signal strength at the receiver (it is worth recalling that GPS signals reach Earth with power levels barely above the radio noise floor), greater resistance to jamming, and significantly increased complexity for any actor attempting to replicate or falsify the signal.

Conceptually, this is a serious approach. It reflects a simple but accurate idea: when a radiofrequency environment becomes contested, resilience relies less on hardening a single dependency than on multiplying different ones.

An important point: resilient does not mean equivalent

This is where a critical perspective must be maintained.

The speakers mentioned accuracy levels on the order of 20 to 25 meters in some cases, and a few meters in others, particularly at certain latitudes. This level of performance is already useful. It may be sufficient to maintain acceptable situational awareness in degraded navigation, avoid total loss of positioning, document an incident, and ensure partial continuity of operations, especially for “standard” navigation.

However, a common misunderstanding must be avoided: a continuity solution is not automatically a full replacement solution.

For some maritime operations, 20 meters represents a comfortable margin. For others, it does not. At sea, this may be entirely sufficient. In narrow channels, port approaches, offshore operations, dredging, cable laying, or any activity requiring high-precision positioning, the nature of the problem changes completely. The requirement is no longer simply to have a position, but to have a position reliable enough to support operational decisions or contractual responsibilities — especially in contexts where GPS provided (or was expected to provide) sub-meter accuracy considered “trusted.”

In other words, a solution like the one presented may have real value as a robust fallback capability, without necessarily being positioned as a universal substitute for high-precision GNSS.

What about real onboard integration?

The webinar also highlighted, perhaps unintentionally, a significant limitation: the gap between technical feasibility and operational integration remains substantial.

The speakers indicated that their system could technically interface with other equipment, potentially including core navigation systems. This is an interesting point, but not sufficient. In the maritime domain, integration only truly exists when it is not only possible, but also accepted by regulation, understood by classification societies, documented in procedures, and usable without ambiguity on the bridge — and applicable across all GNSS-dependent sensors onboard.

This is where a critical part of the future of such solutions lies. As long as an alternative PNT system is perceived as a parallel display or an auxiliary system to be consulted “on the side” (often without specialized expertise onboard), it risks either being underused or, conversely, increasing cognitive load in already stressful situations such as those experienced by crews in the Persian Gulf (a thought for them and their families).

The issue is therefore not just about generating an alternative position. It is about how that position is integrated into navigational decision-making. Who validates it? At what confidence threshold? Under which operational doctrine? And how is it coordinated between ship, fleet, charterers, insurers, and investigators in case of an incident?

The human factor remains decisive

The questions raised during the webinar highlighted that resilience will never be purely technological. Remarks about RADAR, parallel indexing, or celestial navigation were valid, even if they do not constitute a complete solution.

The core issue lies elsewhere: resilience technology does not automatically compensate for a lack of preparation. A crew that is not trained for prolonged GNSS loss, that cannot prioritize conflicting position sources, or that lacks clear switching procedures will remain vulnerable, even with good equipment.

The difficulty is compounded by the fact that GNSS interference does not always manifest as a clear failure. Spoofing, in particular, is dangerous because it can sometimes maintain an appearance of normality — even if, in the Persian Gulf for instance, spoofing has often been relatively crude. In some cases, however, watchkeepers may be confronted with plausible information, sometimes slightly degraded, sometimes deceptively consistent.

This is why training, degraded navigation exercises, and doctrines for managing discrepancies between sensors must now become integral to the broader reflection across all stakeholders (international bodies, national administrations, training institutions, equipment manufacturers, shipowners, insurers).

The economic question remains open

The consortium was right to emphasize insurance, legal, and compliance aspects. In certain regions, the ability to demonstrate a GNSS-independent position could become a real asset — particularly for documenting incidents, contesting incorrect tracks, or demonstrating that a vessel did not follow the route suggested by certain systems (I refer you to my article on an alleged collision case off Oman).

However, the market will also assess these solutions based on their total cost. And that cost never stops at hardware. It includes IT integration, data flows, satellite subscriptions, maintenance, training, documentation, internal acceptance by operational teams, and sometimes the adaptation of bridge procedures.

This is where part of the adoption challenge lies. The need is real, but it is not perceived uniformly depending on fleet profiles, trading areas, logistical constraints, or insurer pressure.

And what about Galileo?

One topic was clearly missing from the discussion: Galileo, almost entirely absent.

Today, any serious reflection on GNSS resilience should include Galileo’s contributions, particularly OSNMA (Open Service Navigation Message Authentication). This function allows compatible receivers to verify the authenticity of navigation messages transmitted by Galileo satellites. It is not a silver bullet, but it represents a significant improvement against certain forms of spoofing. And yes, it is still a satellite-based solution — and therefore not immune to risk either.

However, it is important to understand precisely what it provides. OSNMA improves the ability to detect falsified messages; it does not protect against jamming. Nor does it, on its own, guarantee that a complete navigation solution is automatically “authentic” or “secure” in all circumstances. Its effectiveness will depend on onboard equipment, manufacturer integration, and adoption rates across fleets. One may also regret the lack of widely available commercial sub-meter solutions for shipowners.

Despite this, Galileo deserves a more prominent place in maritime discussions. Not as a standalone answer, but as an additional layer of trust within an architecture combining CRPA-type antennas, multi-constellation GNSS, supervision, inertial systems, traditional navigation methods, and possibly alternative PNT sources such as those presented during the webinar.

2026, a turning point?

Ultimately, the value of the BIMCO webinar goes beyond the specific solution presented.

It shows that the maritime sector is finally starting to view GNSS interference not as a purely technical issue of electronics or radiocommunications, but as a cross-cutting matter of safety, operational continuity, compliance, insurance, and risk management.

This is a significant shift. For a long time, GNSS was treated as an invisible, stable, and implicitly reliable infrastructure. That period is over. Shipowners, insurers, and administrations are continuing — or, for some, only beginning — their reflection on the issue. In certain parts of the world, signal contestation is now part of the “normal” operational environment.

In this context, technological solutions clearly have their place. They address a real need. They introduce diversity into the PNT chain. They can improve detection, continuity, and traceability. But they still need to clear several hurdles to achieve widespread adoption: demonstrating performance across a wider range of scenarios, clarifying their regulatory status, integrating seamlessly into bridge practices, proving their economic viability, and aligning with a broader doctrine of resilient navigation.

My assessment

The BIMCO webinar was useful because it addressed the issue at the right level: resilience, rather than simple troubleshooting.

My view is that the direction is correct. Diversifying PNT sources has become necessary. Relying on GNSS-independent capabilities to maintain usable positioning in contested environments is a serious approach. Incident logging, real-time alerting, and position traceability will also become increasingly valuable.

However, the maturity of such approaches will not be measured solely by technical performance. It will depend on their ability to integrate effectively into the real maritime ecosystem: regulations, bridge operations, training, insurance frameworks, costs, procedures, and operator trust.

The key issue in the coming years will not simply be having an alternative to GNSS. It will be building, onboard and ashore, a trusted and validated PNT architecture capable of absorbing interference without disrupting navigational decision-making.

And in that respect, the most credible solution will not necessarily be the one that promises the most, but the one that combines technical robustness, sufficient accuracy, operational integration, regulatory acceptance, and usability under real-world conditions.